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W.B. Reddaway has been a highly influential figure in Cambridge economics 
during the second half of the 20
th Century.  His method and style of doing 
economics – called the Reddaway-type economics – were quite distinct.  The 
present  paper  explains  Reddaway’s  methodology  by  examining  his  most 
important research contributions.  The title of this essay conveys his distance 
from  mainstream  economists.    His  essential  substantive  difference  with  the 
latter concerned inferential econometrics.  He subscribed to Keynes’ critique of 
Timburgen’s methodology.  In summary, Reddaway regarded economics as an 
empirical, evidence-based subject which, through economic policy, should help 
improve the world.  In his view mathematics could sometimes help, but, more 
often  than  not,  it  obfuscated  economic  reality.    Currently  the  academic 
economics  profession  is  dominated  by  a  priori  theorising  and  deductive 
modelling.    Greater  attention  to  Reddaway’s  legacy  to  economics,  to  its 
research  methods  and  to  teaching,  would  very  much  help  to  rebalance  the 
subject. 
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I 
 
Professor  W.B.  Reddaway  (known  to  friends  and  colleagues  as  Brian 
Reddaway) was an exceptional economist who had a huge influence on how 
economics in Cambridge has been taught and researched. He held leadership 
positions in the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Cambridge for 25 years, 
between  1955  and  1980.  The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  explain 
Reddaway’s  method  and  his  distinct  approach  to  economics.  It  also  briefly 
reviews his life and times. The words in the title summarise his philosophy of 
research as will become clear in the paragraphs which follow.  
 
Brian Reddaway was Director of the Department of Applied Economics (DAE) 
for nearly 15 years, succeeding Sir Richard Stone, the founding Director. The 
DAE was established after WWII on the initiative of J.M. Keynes. It was set up 
as  the  research  arm  of  the  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Politics,  providing 
facilities  for  teaching  staff  to  carry  out  applied  economic  and  social 
investigations.  In  1969,  almost  at  the  end  of  his  tenure  as  DAE  Director, 
Reddaway  was  elected  to  succeed  James  Meade  in  the  Chair  of  Political 
Economy,  the  senior  chair  in  economics  in  Cambridge.  Reddaway  held  this 
chair until 1980, when he formally retired. He continued his association with 
the Faculty for many years after this, doing occasional lecture courses, or one-
off lectures: he positively loved lecturing on applied economic subjects and 
helping younger colleagues with their research. It was only failing health right 
at the end of his life that prevented him from continuing.  
 
As is the custom in Cambridge’s collegiate university structure, in addition to 
his  successive  university  posts  in  the  Faculty,  which  began  in  1939  on  his 
appointment as University Lecturer, he held a Fellowship at Clare College for 
64 years (1938 to 2002). He took a very active part in college life, including 
college  teaching  and  helping  to  manage  the  college’s  investments.  It  was 
acknowledged that he accomplished all these tasks outstandingly well. 
 
This  commentary  on  the  professional  life  and  work  of  Brian  Reddaway  is 
written by a close colleague who regarded him as one of his valued mentors. 
My main purpose is to reflect on and to appraise Reddaway’s legacy in relation 
to  economics,  to  policy-making  and  to  general  social  welfare.  Often, 
Reddaway’s references for his students or colleagues included a statement to 
the effect that it was his practice to tell nothing but the truth. The present essay 
aims  to  do  the  same  in  its  historical  assessment  of  his  career  and  his 
contributions. 
    2
In carrying out this task, I intend to focus on some key analytical issues and 
paradoxes relating to Reddaway’s professional life as a teacher, scholar and 
Cambridge  academic.  First,  anyone  who  has  closely  examined  his  career  is 
struck by the paradox that, although he had enormous influence on economics 
in Cambridge and, through policy-making and advice, on the world outside, his 
impact on the economics profession itself in the narrow academic sense of the 
term was much smaller, particularly outside the UK
1. This is in sharp contrast to 
Stone, who, it is generally recognized, had very little impact on the Economics 
Faculty in Cambridge, but had a large following outside Cambridge and won 
the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 1984.  
 
A second paradox in Reddaway’s career is that politically he was a liberal who 
believed  in  the  market  economy  and  advised  the  Confederation  of  British 
Industry. Yet he was invited by the Cambridge Political Economy Society, a 
group of Cambridge left-wing economists who in the late 1970s founded the 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, to become a patron of the journal. Reddaway 
not only accepted the invitation, but actively helped with the journal’s work.  
 
Thirdly, any discussion of Reddaway’s professional career in Cambridge would 
be incomplete without recognizing his exceptional commitment to teaching and 
examining  students,  and  taking  the  democratic  governance  of  the  university 
seriously,  devoting  substantial  time  and  effort  to  it.  Reddaway’s  Socratic 
approach  to  teaching  sprang  from  and  contributed  to  the  Cambridge  oral 
tradition. It had a profound influence on generations of students who went on to 
shape  the  culture  of  economic  debate  in  Britain,  and  in  international 




My professional and personal association with Brian Reddaway goes back more 
than 40 years, to January 1963, when I came to Cambridge from the University 
of California, Berkeley, to work with Robin Marris at the DAE on managerial 
capitalism.  I  was  still  a  graduate  student  in  Berkeley  and  had  worked  as 
Marris’s research assistant when he was a visiting professor there a year earlier. 
At the DAE Reddaway had just started a project on UK corporate finance and 
because of the obvious synergy of this project with that of Marris’s, it was 
decided that these should be run jointly by Marris and Reddaway. Reddaway, at 
that time and for many years afterwards, wrote, under the nom de plume ‘the 
Academic Investor’, a highly regarded column for the Investors’ Chronicle in 
which he regularly reported on the results of his college’s portfolio, which he 
helped  to  organize.  This  led  to  his  keen  interest  in  corporate  finance  and 
behaviour and hence in these research projects.   3
There was a tempestuous start to my association with Reddaway when I started 
work on the project. One afternoon in the DAE common room we embarked on 
a serious and noisy disagreement about econometrics and time series analysis. 
Reddaway was scathing about the regression analysis of economic time series, 
as it led to spurious correlations, for reasons which are much better understood 
today than they were then.  I provided what I thought was a spirited defence of 
the textbook model of doing such regressions, which at Berkeley I had been 
taught was an adequate approach to the problem.
2  Reddaway was not at all 
convinced, but never held my wrong-headedness against me, regarding it as an 
honest difference of opinion. What was remarkable about this exchange was 
that  it  took  place  between  a  graduate  student  and  a  highly  distinguished 
economist for whom academic hierarchy seemed to have no relevance. Indeed 
one of Reddaway’s characteristic traits throughout his professional life was that 
he was interested only in the validity or otherwise of the argument being made, 
rather than the formal status of the person making it. This did not always endear 
him  to  his  senior  colleagues,  whose  sometimes  feeble  arguments  might  be 
summarily  rejected  in  public.    Brian  Reddaway  was  a  blunt  person  and 
habitually  called  a  spade  a  spade,  though  neither  with  malice  nor  with  any 
intention of point scoring. 
  
Reddaway came from an academic Cambridge family with firm roots in the 
university.  His  father  was  a  historian  and  a  Fellow  of  King’s  and  the  first 
Censor  (Head)  of  Fitzwilliam  House,  before  that  institution  became  a  full-
fledged college.  This background gave Reddaway total self-confidence, which 
later led him to become the scourge of the central bureaucracy in the university. 
He  was  extremely  critical  of  administrative  inefficiency  and  regarded 
administrators as the servants of the dons and students, rather than their masters. 
Many senior university administrators found themselves at the receiving end of 
his sharp comments. 
 
He  was  a  brilliant  student  and  in  1931  won  a  scholarship  to  read  Natural 
Sciences  at  King’s  College,  Cambridge.  In  the  event  he  was  advised  to  do 
Mathematics  in  the  first  year  and  Natural  Sciences  in  the  last  two  years. 
However, after obtaining a First in Part 1 Mathematics he opted for Economics 
instead,  because  of  his  strong  concern  with  mass  unemployment  and 
widespread poverty in the 1930s. He had the great fortune of being personally 
supervised by Richard Kahn and John Maynard Keynes, neither of whom he 
disappointed. He visited Russia with his father soon after his graduation, and 
used  this  opportunity  to  do  independent  research  on  the  Russian  financial 
system (with the blessing of his prospective employer -- the Bank of England). 
An essay based on this material won him the University’s coveted Adam Smith 
prize, and on Keynes’ recommendation was subsequently published as a short   4
book by Macmillan. It is said that it continued to be included in LSE reading 




After  a  short  stint  at  the  Bank  of  England,  where  the  structure  seemed  to 
provide scant prospects for early promotion, Reddaway worked for two years in 
Australia, Keynes having recommended him to L. F. Giblin, Professor at the 
University of Melbourne and also a recently appointed non-executive Director 
of the Australian central bank. He apparently spent two happy and productive 
years as a tutor at the University of Melbourne while also assisting Giblin at the 
central bank. (Lawrence Reddaway, 2003) 
 
Reddaway quickly made his mark on the Australian scene. First, he published a 
review of Keynes’s (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money which is regarded as a classic interpretation of the book. Second, he took 
a  prominent  part  in  the  ongoing  debate  on  wage  levels  in  Australia.    The 
Australian government at that time favoured wage cuts in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of the country’s mining and industry.  The trade unions were 
naturally  opposed.      Reddaway  testified  in  the  Commonwealth  Arbitration 
Court in favour of the trade union position that real wages should be raised 
rather than cut.  The Court accepted almost fully the 23-year-old Englishman’s 
recommendations and the resulting wage award lasted 15 years, and came to be 
called the Reddawage.  In 1938 Reddaway returned to England to a Fellowship 
at Clare College. Nevertheless, throughout his career he maintained his early 
connection with Australia and visited the country many times.  
 
Brian  Reddaway  and  Barbara  Bennet’s  marriage  in  1939  generated  an 
environment in which both blossomed and which was highly supportive of their 
offspring and younger generations. The Reddaways had four children, Peter, 
Lawrence,  Stewart  and  Jacky.  Since  Brian’s  death  (Barbara  died  earlier  in 
1996), they have provided us with their reflections (as well as those of others) 
on their parents and on their family life together which suggest that they were a 
happy,  cohesive  family  in  which  both  parents  fully  participated
3.    The 
Reddaways had a modest, almost abstemious lifestyle and it seems that their 
savings  were  spent  on  family  holidays  which  were  quite  frequent.  Stewart 
observed ‘Dad provided us with a loving and secure home background. This 
was based on what he did for us, on his relationships with us and on the very 
happy marriage between him and mum’. Daughter Jacky notes that their parents 
formed ‘a remarkable partnership which provided great comfort and stimulation 
to their family…’. Peter writes, ‘Dad was an undemonstrative, but loyal family 
man. Although Mum initiated virtually all family and social events she always   5
got his full support. He pulled the carrots, picked the gooseberries, tidied the 
flowerbeds, mowed the lawn, laid the table, poured the gin and tonic and carved 
the  roast  chicken.  He  then  contributed  in  lively  style  to  the  conversation, 
throwing in, often with a theatrical flourish, stories from his repertoire of some 
twenty  wellworn  favourites’.  Peter  notes  that  in  general  he  brought  up  his 
children more by example than instruction.  
 
Lawrence notes that WBR was ‘thoroughly English by both birth and habit but 
thoroughly international in his outlook...’, yet he lived all his life in Cambridge. 
The Reddaway family had lived in the city for one hundred and twenty years, 
ever  since  Reddaway’s  father  entered  the  Leys  School.  From  this  base  in 
Cambridge,  WBR  and  Barbara  travelled  widely  and  spent    time  in  several 
European and third world countries as well as the US and Australia. He was 
evidently a  good linguist and, apart from German and French, he especially 
learnt Spanish before going to Argentina to advise the government. 
 
In their middle age, the Reddaways devoted a great deal of their time and effort 
to their extended family. As well as their four children, WBR was survived by 
nine grandchildren and one great grandchild. Brian and Barbara had by their 
grandchildren’s accounts extremely good relations with the second generation. 
 
Reddaway’s prodigious research output and contributions to the work of the 
Faculty, University and governments in the UK and abroad, owed a tremendous 
amount to Barbara. Her social skills were very helpful in softening his critical, 
and  often  abrupt,  way  of  interacting  with  colleagues,  students  and  friends. 
Friends and research students from around the world were always welcome at 
their  Cambridge  home.  I  have  the  most  wonderful  memories  of  Barbara’s 
cheerfulness and gaiety and remember with pleasure her remarks congratulating 
me on my promotion to a personal Chair in Cambridge: “The whole world will 




Turning to Reddaway’s research contributions he was certainly not an orthodox 
or a traditional economist. By this I mean that he was much less concerned with 
economic doctrine than with solving practical problems. The solutions to these 
problems  inevitably  required theoretical  understanding,  and when  the  theory 
was not available, he had to craft it himself, as we shall see in the case of his 
Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  study.  Most  importantly,  for  him 
quantification  was  essential  to  the  examination  of  economic  phenomena, 
particularly  if  the  aim  was  to  draw  policy  conclusions.  He  had  a  distinct 
methodology  and  approach  to  economics.  He  himself  suggests  in  his   6
autobiographical  entry  in  Who’s  Who  in  Economics  (1999)  that  his  most 
important  scholarly  contributions  included  two  large  projects  –  one  on  the 
effects on the UK balance of payments of direct investment overseas by UK 
companies, and the other on the recently introduced selective employment tax – 
both of which he undertook at the DAE in the 1960s.  These projects involved 
large  survey  teams  and  raised  important  conceptual,  statistical  and  data 
questions.  In  tackling  these  he  combined  great  imagination  with  exemplary 
economic sense. The results were reported in Reddaway, 1967 and 1968 (FDI), 
and Reddaway 1970 and 1973 (Selective Employment Tax).   
 
In order to indicate the nature and qualities of Reddaway’s research, two areas 
will be reviewed in some detail below: his work on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and on Indian planning and economic development
4. The commentary 
will focus not so much on the specific conclusions reached, but on the methods 
used and how the research was done. These studies also bring out Reddaway’s 
attitude towards (a) the role of the government and (b) the use of mathematics 
and econometrics. Both (a) and (b) in turn are helpful in clarifying his approach 
to  economic  research.  He  himself  summed  up  his  way  of  doing  applied 
economics as follows:  
 
I  have  attempted  to  tackle  practical  problems,  whether  on  full 
employment,  growth,  underdeveloped  economies,  inflation,  the 
effects of direct investment overseas, the selective employment tax, 
or the investment of portfolios. To do so, I have sought to combine 
theory  with  realistic  data  and  to  look  for  the  factors  which  are 
quantitatively  important,  rather  than  those  which  are  intellectually 
stimulating. I have tried to be pragmatic in my choice of methods for 
tackling problems and to be clear about the alternative position with 
which comparisons are effectively being made (and to be sure that it 
is a meaningful and consistent one). Favourite slogan for pupils and 
research  colleagues:  ‘It  is  better  to  be  roughly  right  than  to  be 
precisely wrong (or irrelevant).’ 
(Reddaway, 1999, p.932, emphasis in the original). 
 
In other words, in the real world, even though data are scarce, it is better to have 
rough orders of magnitude than none at all, in order not to operate entirely in 
the realm of abstraction. If data (or theory) did not exist, Reddaway’s method 
was to use surveys to ask people for the information. If existing theory was 
inadequate, he would attempt to extend it to fill the gaps. However, the latter 
was not his prime aim. Colleagues recall him referring to theory as ‘talky talk’. 
 
   7
V 
 
These  attributes  of  Reddaway’s  research  methods  are  illustrated  by  the  FDI 
study, which raises complex issues of applied economic analysis. Moreover, 
although  the  context  today  is  very  different,  the  subject  itself  is  even  more 
important now than it was then.
 5  The terms of reference for the FDI exercise 
were ‘to study the effects of direct outward private investment on the United 
Kingdom balance of payments and on the United Kingdom economy generally’ 
(Reddaway, 1967, p.15). There were very few published statistics available on 
the subject and Reddaway and his colleagues had to use extensive survey data 
to  obtain the  information  at  company  level  needed  for  this  research.  At  the 
outset, Reddaway set out the issues as well as his basic methodology in non-
technical and non-mathematical, but nonetheless rigorous, economic terms.  He 
identified the gaps in information and indicated how they would be filled in the 
course of the research.  He (1967, p.167) noted:  
 
We  live  nowadays  in  a  managed  economy.  It  follows  that  any 
question  in  macro-economics  can  be  answered  only  on  specified 
assumptions  about  the  Government’s  policy  (and  powers)  in 
managing the economy. Strictly speaking, there are as many answers 
as there are varieties of assumptions which one thinks it useful to 
make.  …  There  is  no  single  ‘other  things  being  equal’which  it  is 
clearly right to assume. (emphasis in original)   
 
The simplifying, but plausible, assumptions he outlined about the government’s 
role in relation to the basic analysis of the effects of a marginal increase in 
overseas  investment  by  British  companies,  included  the  following  (1967,  p. 
168):  
  
a) The government’s major objective is to secure a level of total demand for the 
output of British goods and services which gives ‘full employment’, and in the 
main it is successful.  
 
b)  At  times  of  balance  of  payments  crisis  this  objective  has  to  be  (and  is) 
subordinated to ‘the defence of sterling’. …. 
 
c) In striving for (a) the Government operates on the internal components of 
demand … and leaves exports and imports free from direct manipulation; the 
exchange rate is held constant. 
 
Reddaway further suggests that the effects of FDI can be assessed only on the 
basis  of  comparisons  between  what  actually  happened  and  what  might   8
otherwise have happened. He argues that this raises three kinds of  problem 
(Reddaway, 1967, p.86): 
 
a) What sort of assumptions should be made about the nature of the alternative 
position? 
 
b) How can those assumptions be translated into figures? 
 
c) How can these figures be used to answer the really important questions? 
 
Reddaway proposed (pp. 169-170) that, on these assumptions, together with his 
carefully set out counter-factual (what would have happened otherwise), if an 
extra 100 million pounds of overseas direct investment occurred in a particular 
year, the effects on the UK economy might be summarized as follows: 
 
i) There are x million pounds additional exports - and we hope to find x.  
 
ii)  x  million  pounds  less  is  spent  on  home  investment  in  marginal 
developments. 
 
iii) The levels of employment, consumption, imports and national income are 
unaffected in that year.  
 
iv) (100 – x) million pounds of additional overseas debt is incurred (or portfolio 
investment may be reduced, or reserves used). 
 
Much of the information needed for Reddaway’s enquiry had to come from the 
British companies that normally undertook FDI. He noted (p. 141) that:  
 
we  realized  at  an  early  stage  that  we  were  engaged  in  a  difficult 
pioneering process. … The project would need to be an exercise in 
co-operation, with personal contact between the research team and 
company representatives playing a very important role. 
 
The survey indeed included difficult questions, some of a counter-factual and 
hypothetical  kind,  which  company  officials  were  not  easily  able  to  answer 
without help from the research team.  Reddaway therefore placed responsibility 
for deciding on final figures for the research project on the researchers rather 
than on the companies, because the former were familiar with the logic of the 
problem and had also accumulated experience from interviewing a number of 
companies in the sample.  
   9
This detailed description of Reddaway’s approach to the FDI research indicates 
important differences between his methods and those conventionally used in 
such analyses. The first is his use of plain English (instead of mathematical 
equations) to set out from first principles the basic methodology to be used. 
Second, though they were elementary, the statistical methods employed in the 
FDI  study  were  in  my  judgement  wholly  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the 
economic  problem  and  the  available  statistical  data.  A  conventional  study 
would  have  used  multiple  regression  equations  and  employed  statistical 
significance tests to draw inferences about the population. In Reddaway’s view, 
these  were  often  misleading,  an  issue  that  is  discussed  below.    Third,  he 
regarded  assumptions  made  about  the  role  of  government  to  be  critical  in 
applied  economic  analysis  of  real  world  problems.  (This  issue  is  discussed 
further from a theoretical perspective in section VII.) Finally, contrary to the 
prejudice  in  the  profession  against  interviewing  business  people  (which  still 
prevails today), Reddaway’s basic analysis of the effects of FDI was based on 
survey data derived from business people’s answers. He not only valued their 
answers but encouraged close co-operation between them and members of his 
research team. Reddaway’s approach to the last point is now gaining ground, at 
least in business schools. In view of the dearth of appropriate official data in 






Reddaway’s (1962) book on the development of the Indian economy is a highly 
unusual but a very important contribution to studies of planning and economic 
development. The book won high esteem from most (but not all) scholars in 
India and abroad. Despite very changed circumstances, its messages continue to 
be highly relevant for India and many other countries. The book arose from an 
Indian Planning Commission request to Reddaway to assess the consistency and 
viability of their recently formulated Third Five Year Plan.
7 From the start, he 
noted that although Indian plans did not have to be as comprehensive as Soviet 
five-year plans, the Third Plan nevertheless required more detailed elaboration 
to be useful as a practical planning instrument. Reddaway’s approach was to 
examine the extent to which the plan was consistent with the available foreign 
exchange and the resources available for internal investment for each year, and 
the results were incorporated in the revised Third Plan. Apart from difficulties 
relating to the consistency of the Plan, Reddaway was also concerned that the 
Plan document should be drafted and presented in a way that made it credible, 
so that it could generate the necessary support and action.  
   10 
The book drew a sharply critical article in Oxford Economic Papers from a 
leading Indian economist, Professor Padma Desai (1963). In response, in the 
same  issue  of  the  journal,  the  author  vigorously  defended  his  position. 
(Reddaway, 1963). Desai argued that the book did not set out a fully specified 
planning model so that it was difficult to judge whether the plan was efficient or 
not. She also thought that, from the information given in the book, the model 
was under-determined, i.e. the number of variables to be determined was greater 
than the number of equations. She further expressed irritation over the fact that 
Reddaway had not bothered to specify his model in terms of equations, which 
she  regarded  as  essential  to  understanding  the  underlying  economic  and 
statistical analysis.  
 
In response, Reddaway (1963, pp.2) observed:  
 
I saw, and still see, no advantage in expressing the reasoning in the 
form of mathematical equations. Such equations are a useful device 
where  there  is  a  great  deal  of  mutual  dependence  of  variables, 
because a verbal description cannot then easily show the interactions 
and the process of mutual determination; moreover, it is then very 
laborious to arrive at the solutions which fit the conditions, except by 
some mathematical process analogous to the solution of simultaneous 
equations; and one might fall into the trap of not realizing that the 
system was under-determined, and arriving by trial and error at a set 
of figures which fulfilled the conditions but had no superiority over 
many other sets which would also do so.
8  
 
Reddaway went on to explain the limited focus of his exercise. The text of his 
book made it clear that he was not providing a model for the Third Plan, but 
only checking the viability of the plan formulated by the Commission. He also 
argued that his model was not underdetermined. 
 
As  is  clear  from  the  quotation  above,  Reddaway  was  fully  aware  of  the 
advantages  of  the  use  of  mathematics  for  expository  purposes  in  certain 
situations, but also thought that a number of interactions between variables in 
the real world did not fit easily into formal  equations. He  was  certainly no 
mathematical ignoramus, having obtained a first class in Mathematics Part I, as 
noted  earlier.    My  own  experience  is  that  he  was  not  hostile  to  the  use  of 
mathematics in empirical analysis provided it gave added clarity or substance to 
the argument. My book on takeovers (Singh, 1971) included a chapter on the 
methodology of discriminant analysis and its relationship to other multi-variate 
methods.  The  discussion  was  in  terms  of  matrix  algebra.  Reddaway  was 
extremely  supportive  and  in  fact  helped  me  correct  some  errors  that   11 
mathematical colleagues had missed. Also, it is not generally known that he 
played a key role in the appointment of Frank Hahn, a mathematical economist, 




Reddaway’s  work  on  Indian  planning  naturally  raises  questions  about  his 
attitude towards planning in general, and more broadly his views on the role of 
government  in  advanced  and  developing  countries.  Although  politically  a 
liberal, believing, as did Keynes, that resource allocation should by and large be 
left to the market, he thought that social welfare could often be improved by 
government action. During the Second World War Reddaway was seconded to 
the Board of Trade where he worked as Chief Statistician. In that capacity he 
helped  to  design  the  clothes  rationing  system  and  also  among  many  other 
things, helped notably to improve the UK indices of industrial production and 
consumer prices.  
 
Reddaway’s attitude towards government intervention was greatly influenced 
by this wartime experience. At that time, among the government economists, 
Reddaway was regarded as being very much on the interventionist side. The 
statisticians  at  the  Board  of  Trade  were  half-jokingly  nick-named  the 
‘Gosplanners’  because  of  their  interventionist  outlook.  In  contrast,  other 
government economists, notably James Meade and John Maynard Keynes were 
called  ‘thermostaters’,  indicating  that  they  believed  in  limiting  government  
intervention, to macroeconomic policy to ensure full employment. In this view, 
microeconomics should entirely be the sphere of private households and firms. 
Reddaway was a pragmatic  economist and a problem solver par excellence. 
These  attributes,  as  well  as  his  war  time  experience,  led  him  to  regard  the 
government as part of the solution rather than the problem. Indeed he took a 
very active part in government activity and policy making on various occasions. 
Reddaway served the UK and other national governments and the international 
community in a number of different ways, making notable contributions to the 
work of each. 
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Reddaway’s expertise was also used in a number of British colonies to construct 
indices  of  retail  prices,  which  were  often  socially  sensitive.  Reddaway  was 
evidently able to carry out these technical tasks well because he was aware of 
their social dimensions, and was willing to consult with the relevant groups and 
build a social consensus. He thereby avoided the social disruption which often 
followed the introduction of new price indices (Reddaway, 1995; Times, 2002). 
After the war Reddaway served on Royal Commissions and equivalent bodies 
and high-level government committees in the UK, Australia and a number of   12 
developing countries. He also acted as Director of the Research Division of the 
Organization  for  European  Economic  Cooperation  (OEEC),  the  body 
implementing the Marshall Plan which subsequently became the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
 
In his role as member of the UK Prices and Incomes Board, and of the State of 
Victoria Liquor Board in Australia, Reddaway was perhaps ahead of his time, in 
that he took very serious account of the prevailing administrative and customary 
social  arrangements,  how  their  operation  affected  outcomes  and  how  at  the 
policy level such arrangements could be improved.  
 
Similarly, in his review of Keynes’s General Theory, mentioned earlier in a 
different  context,  his  critical  remarks  point  him  to  the  omission  of  the 
institutional  factors  which  constrained  constrain  economic  agents,  were  also 
ahead of their time. In a notable passage, Reddaway (1936) wrote: 
 
The logic of the argument would be improved if the rate of interest 
were not so frequently used to represent the cost of raising capital; 
particularly  in  Australia  the  other  elements,  such  as  quantitative 
control  of  credit,  are  often  far  more  important,  and  the  rates 
applicable to different industries and borrowers may move differently 
for institutional reasons. (page 107) 
 
An important theoretical contribution, for which he does not always receive due 
credit,  is his  explicit  introduction of  the  role  of  government  into  Keynesian 
analysis  (Reddaway,  1964).  Reddaway,  and  others  who  had  reviewed  The 
General Theory when it was first published, were asked to revisit their reviews 
and comment on them in the light of subsequent events. He responded with a 
whole new article, which makes an important contribution to Keynesian theory. 
He confessed that in his 1936 review he had been insufficiently critical of the 
way the role of government had been presented in The General Theory.  He 
considered that with the big increase in the ‘size of government’ in the post 
WWII period, in many industrial countries, the government’s consumption and 
investment behaviour were increasingly central to the workings of the modern 
economy.    However  these  were  not  necessarily  subject  to  the  same 
considerations  as  those  that  influence  corporate  and  household  behaviour. 
Reddaway therefore suggested that the government’s savings and investment 
functions require separate treatment. 
 
This  theoretical  perspective  on  the  government’s  role  in  the  economy  has 
serious implications for applied economic work. Reddaway argued that, unlike 
Keynes in The General Theory, who in effect assumed that fiscal policy was   13 
neutral, in the post-World War II economy in which government expenditure 
was relatively high, it was not legitimate to assume that fiscal policy would 
necessarily be distributionally neutral.  Each government was likely to have an 
agenda of its own and to use changes in taxation and expenditure to achieve 
social  goals  such  as  full  employment,  price  stability  and  enhanced  social 
welfare.    Hence,  it  was  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  detailed 
macroeconomic assumptions associated with its monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
These points were fully taken on board in Reddaway’s own empirical work, as 
we saw in our discussion of his analysis of the effects of FDI. 
   
    VIII 
 
I turn now to the question of Reddaway’s legacy and the nature of his influence 
inside  and  beyond  Cambridge,  during  his  long  period  of  leadership  in  the 
faculty. Reddaway exercised intellectual influence on the ‘narrow’ academic 
economics  profession,  as  defined  earlier,  as  well  as  on  the  broader  public, 
through a number of different channels. First and foremost, he led by example 
and over time his own research, including that described above, became more 
widely  known  and  increasingly  influential.    Secondly  Reddaway’s  influence 
came from the work of the DAE, where he was a hands-on director. Thirdly, 
and  very importantly,  Cambridge  students  trained  in  ‘Reddaway  economics’ 
spread his approach to the City, the government, the media and other places 
where they went to work. Posner (2002) noted that this led to an improvement 
in the level of economic comment in the UK. 
 
Reddaway’s assumption of the directorship of the DAE in 1955, on Stone’s 
appointment to his chair, led to a decisive change in the department’s research 
agenda.  Under  Stone’s  leadership  the  DAE  had  built  up  an  international 
reputation as an outstanding centre for research in econometric theory. Stone’s 
was a hard act to follow, but  Reddaway did so with great energy and total 
conviction.  He  changed  the  direction  of  the  department’s  research  towards 
applied economics and economic policy. 
 
Under his leadership in the 1960s the DAE was a vibrant and exciting place, 
which  was  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the  world’s  leading  institutions  for 
applied economic research. Reddaway, as many observers have noted, was in 
his element as the Director
10. He was a liberal academic in the best sense of the 
term and let a hundred flowers bloom. The DAE hosted projects on a wide 
range of subjects, including notably economic history, corporate finance, labour 
markets,  regional  economies  and  economic  sociology,  to  each  of  which  he 
himself made significant contributions. Reddaway provided autonomy to the   14 
investigators,  but  they  had  to  perform  to  his  high  intellectual  and  critical 
standards. He was unstinting in his help when a project, for whatever reason, 
got into difficulties or an investigator sought assistance. 
 
In my view, one reason why the Department was so successful at this time was 
that  it  had  under  the  same  roof  economists  with  effectively  two  different 
approaches  to  applied  economics—that  of  Reddaway  himself,  as  outlined 
above, and that of Stone, who continued to have a large research group in the 
Department even after he resigned the Directorship. However, by then, Stone’s 
interest had shifted from theoretical to applied econometrics, and his new group 
worked  mainly  on  the  latter  issues  (Smith,  1998).  The  Cambridge  Growth 
Project, which he and Alan Brown co-directed at the DAE, was concerned with 
a real world question of applied economics and policy analysis – to formulate a 
comprehensive  indicative  plan  for  the  UK  economy.  However,  its  methods 
differed from those of Reddaway and his collaborators, in that it made extensive 
use of applied econometrics. 
 
I believe it was the unexpected synergy between the economists working on the 
growth project and those working in the non-econometric Reddaway paradigm 
which made the Department the place to do applied economic research. The 
diversity of its research output was widely appreciated. The institution had a 
vigorous research culture and enormous self-confidence. Instead of being the 
research  wing  of  the  Faculty,  it  acquired  its  own  intellectual  autonomy  and 
became as well if not better known than the Faculty, which still included among 
its  teaching  officers  legendary  figures  like  Richard  Kahn,  Joan  Robinson, 
Nicholas Kaldor, James Meade, David Champernowne and Richard Goodwin. 
 
Reddaway’s influence on the ‘narrow’ academic economic profession, at least 
in the UK, was probably also advanced by his high public profile in the 1960s, 
with  memberships  in  Royal  Commissions  and  important  government 
committees, his Fellowship of the British Academy in 1967, and his Presidency 
of the Royal Economic Society. Between 1971 and 1976, Reddaway also edited 
the  Economic  Journal  together  with  Cambridge  colleagues  David 
Champernowne and Phyllis Deane. In that capacity he and his colleagues did 
influence the academic economic profession, not only in the UK but also in the 
US and elsewhere, in the sense that unnecessary mathematics in articles was 
discouraged  and  papers  were  selected  on  their  economic  merit  rather  than 
because of the sophistication of the techniques used. Authors were encouraged 
to  present  their  critical  assumptions  and  their  main  results  in  plain  English. 
However, after he and his co-editors left the journal, the academic profession 
went back to its traditional ways. Some of the reasons for this are indicated in 
the following account.   15 
Despite the modus vivendi between Reddaway and Stone and their respective 
research  groups  at  the  DAE,  in  the  1960s    Reddaway’s  own  attitude  to 
econometrics  did  not  move  far  from  that  of  Keynes’s  critique  of  Tinbergen 
(1938).  The  Cambridge  Keynesian  economists  continued  in  general  to  be 
sceptical about the subject, on the familiar grounds that there are far too many 
relevant  variables  as  well  as  possible  interactions  between  them  in  the  real 
world for econometrics to be able to cope with. The problem is compounded by 
frequent  structural  changes  in  economic  relationships.  However,  at  a  more 
elementary level Reddaway was highly critical of normal econometric practice 
for not distinguishing statistical from economic significance. This is a simple 
point and one might think that it would apply only to a small minority of poor 
practitioners and would disappear over time.  
 
Subsequent research, however, suggests  that this does not seem to be the case. 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) found that of the 182 full-length papers published 
in  the  1980s  in  the  American  Economic  Review,  70%  did  not  distinguish 
between  economic  and  statistical  significance.  Many  people  have  suggested 
that, as a result of the publication of this article itself in a leading journal, the 
situation  must  have  greatly  improved,  as  this  is  an  elementary  point  which 
everybody can understand. But not according to Ziliak and McCloskey (2004). 
They find that in the 1990s, of 137 papers using a test of statistical significance 
in the American Economic Review, a huge 82% ‘mistook a merely statistically 
significant  finding  for  an  economically  significant  finding’.  Their  survey 
indicated  that  a  large  majority  (81%) believed  that  looking  at  the  sign  of  a 
coefficient  rather  than  its  magnitude  was  adequate  from  an  economic 
perspective. The authors attribute this sorry state of affairs partly to the race to 
get articles published in academic journals, and the belief of most contributors 
that journal referees like to see statistically significant positive results
11. Such 
considerations may also have been responsible for the roll-back of Reddaway’s 
way  of  doing  economics  from  the  pages  of  the  Economic  Journal  after  he 




Whether  or  not  Reddaway  had  significant  lasting  influence  on  academic 
economics outside Cambridge, he certainly had an enormous impact within it. 
As Professor of Political Economy, he took a full part in teaching, examining, 
Tripos reform and examination reform. He was Chairman of the Faculty Board 
of Economics and Politics for most of the 1970s, when there were frequent 
clashes with the university’s General Board, i.e. the central administration. He 
was  an  outstandingly  good  lecturer  and  teacher.  He  also  understood  that  in 
order to influence teaching, one had to take a full part in examining. This is   16 
because, in the Cambridge system, the examination questions this year usually 
become next year’s teaching questions for the students’ tutorials. Reddaway 
was  successful  in  the  early  1960s  in  introducing  a  compulsory  paper  in 
economics and social statistics for most second year students. This was however 
rather  different  from  statistical  papers  in  other  universities.  It  did  not  teach 
much  statistical  technique,  but  emphasized  empirical  analysis  of  economic 
issues; particular attention was given to national income accounting and to the 
balance  of  payments  identities  and  statistics.  Effectively,  it  was  a  paper  in 
applied  economics  which  had  seemingly  simple  questions,  but  which  would 
even today test PhD students in economics at most universities. Reddaway’s 
questions were carefully crafted to test the student’s ability to use real-world 
data to illuminate economic issues. 
 
These questions, which came to be known as ‘Reddaway-type’ questions, were 
very important to the teaching of economics in Cambridge. Normally one might 
not want to reproduce an examination paper in an essay of this kind, but in the 
present case it forms a significant part of Reddaway’s teaching which had an 
impact on the broad profession, and so is important to his intellectual legacy. 
He set the following typical question in the 1964 examination. 
 
You are employed by a business tycoon of uncertain politics, who got a 
II.1 in economics, but did not take the statistics paper. You find that he 
has gone away for the afternoon leaving the following note: 
 
‘I spent yesterday evening between two old College friends, T.Ory and 
L.Abour. Ory was trying to convince me that the economic record for 
1959-63 reflected great credit on the government, because there had been 
good rises in all the following real terms: 
(a) The total production of goods and services. 
(b) Output per head in manufacturing 
(c)  Foreign trade 
(d)  Capital formation 
(e)  Personal  consumption,  both  in  total  and  per  head  of 
population 
 
Moreover  he  insisted  that  there  were  other  favourable  features, 
such as: 
I.  Unemployment has been negligible 
II. The  growth  in  the  quantity  of  money  had  been  no 
greater than was justified by the rise in production 
III.  The  rise  in  prices  had  slowed  down  to  an  easily 
tolerable pace.   17 
IV. The  balance  of  payments  had  on  the  whole  been 
favourable. 
V. The  international  position  of  the  pound  had  been 
strengthened. 
 
On the other hand Abour maintained that in a progressive economy 
it was natural to have rises in all the items in Ory’s list, and the real 
feature of the period was their smallness. As for his other points, 
Abour’s rejoinder was as follows: 
1. Unemployment had been rising throughout the period. 
2. The  movements  in  the  quantity  of  money  were,  as 
such, of no real importance. 
3. The rise in prices had been far from negligible, and 
had been kept down largely by the stability of import 
prices, for which even a Tory government could hardly 
claim the credit. 
4. By  the  relevant  tests,  the  balance  of  payments  had 
been  unfavourable,  and  indeed  the  Government  had 
used  its  bad  state  as  an  argument  for  keeping  down 
wages. 
5. We ended the period with less reserves than the start, 
and greater liabilities. 
 
Please  get  out  the  statistics  which  you  consider  relevant  for 
judging the truth of the above matters, prepare tables and/or graphs 
in such a way that I can draw conclusions from them, and write 
notes  on  what  your  own  conclusions  are,  indicating  any  places 
where these are of a subjective character. (emphasis in original) 
 
 
The students were provided with the National Income Blue Book and another 
government  source  book,  Economic  Trends.  This  was  essentially  the  whole 
examination, to be completed within three hours.
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Reddaway’s academic legacy includes his commitment to intellectual rigour, 
and to the teaching and welfare of students. He also believed in extending to 
them  the  democratic  governance  of  the  university.  In  the  1970s  as  Faculty 
Board chairman, he sided with the students and the majority in the Faculty, in 
conflict with the central authorities over students’ demands for representation 
and  for  changed  methods  of  assessment.  He  was  in  the  forefront  of  these 
struggles with all his formidable debating skills. Thus, student participation in   18 
the university governance was another important aspect of Reddaway’s legacy 
as a Cambridge academic. 
 
This is perhaps best represented by an example – an extract from Reddaway’s 
‘fly-sheet’  responding  to  the  one  from  conservative  dons  on  the  issue  of 
declassing  of  the  Part  I  exam.    It  is  classic  Reddaway  and  is  also  worth 
reproducing at some length to indicate the kind of energy and commitment he 
brought to this task. 
 
DECLASSING IN PART I OF THE ECONOMICS TRIPOS 
(Reply to the non-placet fly-sheet) 
 
I am circulating this fly-sheet as the representative of the Faculty Board 
of Economics and Politics who was appointed to reply to points made in 
the non-placet fly-sheet. 
 
Attempts to confuse the issue 
The fly-sheet confuses the issue by exaggerating greatly the importance 
of a very modest proposal. Its conclusion, ‘Declassing signposts the road 
to  uniform  mediocrity’,  is  a  pure  assertion,  supported  by  no  evidence 
whatever, and reached only by a series of leaps in the argument.  
 
Let me give two examples of these leaps: 
(a) Economics Part I is unusual in being taken after one year, and this 
fact weighed heavily with the Faculty Board in its decision to ask 
for declassing. Paragraph 2 of the fly-sheet actually draws attention 
to the one-year character of Economics Part I, where the authors 
kindly tell the Faculty Board how the subject should be taught. But 
paragraph 4 says ‘If the Regent House acquiesce in these proposals 
we shall soon be told that the arguments for them apply with equal 
weight to other particular triposes.’ This may of course be said by 
irresponsible people, but one can hardly imagine a Faculty Board 
using the argument to support a proposal to de-class a two-year 
Part  I;  and  the  General  Board  would  surely  point  out  the  non-
sequitur  if  it  did.  The  fly-sheet,  however,  proceeds  as  if  the 
declassing  of  a  single  one-year  Part  I  inevitably  means  the 
declassing of all Part I’s. 
(b) The same fourth paragraph also deftly slides the discussion from 
‘classing in Part I’ to ‘classing in examinations’, and so implies 
(without of  course  producing any  evidence)  that  declassing  will 
spread inevitably to all Part II’s as well.   19 
Thus a small experiment in the Economics Faculty is held out as a threat 
to the very survival of the system of classing in the university as a whole. 
I invite the members of the Regent House to judge the realism of this 
picture,  remembering  that  declassing  has  not  been  proposed  for 
Economics Part II, because the Faculty Board believes that classing in its 
final examination brings considerable net advantages. 
 
The more serious matter is, however, the unsupported assumption in the 
fly-sheet  that  declassing  in  Economics  Part  I  will  lead  to  ‘uniform 
mediocrity’ amongst the students. This type of ‘argument’ seems to me 
no more convincing than the objections to the Faculty Board’s proposals 
about dissertations in 1972-73, which experience has now shown to be 
wholly  erroneous:  I  am  fortified  in  my  scepticism  by  the  fact  that 
declassing  of  the  first  year  examination  in  Oxford  produced  no  such 
result. And indeed the fly-sheet itself seems quite uncertain about the 
reactions  of  candidates  to  declassing:  paragraph  3  doubts  whether  the 
strain  on  Part  I  candidates  would  be  reduced  ‘given  the  detailed 
information  which  would  be  supplied  to  the  candidates’  tutors’; 
paragraph 4 on the other hand implies that they will ignore their tutors’ 
reactions and seek no more than ‘uniform mediocrity’…  
  (W. B. Reddaway, March 1976) 
   
In the event, these particular proposals were rejected by a vote of the university 
at large, but others were accepted, and Reddaway’s role in helping to formulate 




One paradox mentioned at the beginning – why the left-wing economists of the 
CJE  invited  Reddaway  to  be  their  patron,  and  why  he  accepted  –  has  an 
uncomplicated  answer.  Many  younger  heterodox  economists  in  Cambridge 
were  as  dissatisfied  with  pure  theory  of  the  Cambridge  kind  (from  Joan 
Robinson  and  her  colleagues)  as  they  were  with  the  abstractions  of  general 
equilibrium  theory.  They  regarded  Reddaway’s  scepticism  about  economic 
theory and his emphasis on empirical and policy analysis as much more helpful. 
They also shared his distrust of the over-use of mathematical and econometric 
techniques. Reddaway for his part was not concerned with ideology, but with 
the fact that these people were doing economics in much the same way as he 
was doing it himself. 
 
I hope I have managed to show the unorthodoxy of Reddaway’s approach to 
economics. His own studies demonstrate that high quality research can be done   20 
without  using  mathematical  equations  and  inferential  econometrics.  Like 
Keynes, Reddaway believed in using economic analysis to improve the world. 
He was an astringent intellectual who was not afraid to ask what he called ‘idiot 
boy’ questions and had the courage to say that the emperor frequently had no 
clothes.  He  had  less  time  for  economic  theory  than  Keynes,  but  this  was 
because he thought that Keynes had provided much of what macroeconomic 
theory was needed. What was required was not more beautiful abstractions, but 
answers, perhaps rough, to real world questions.  
 
Reddaway thus regarded economics as an empirical, evidence-based subject, 
which, through economic policy, should help improve the world. In his view, 
mathematics  could  sometimes  help  but,  more  often  than  not,  it  obfuscated 
economic reality. Currently, the academic economics profession is dominated 
by a priori theorising and deductive modelling. Greater attention to Reddaway’s 
legacy  to  economics,  to  its  research  methods  and  to  teaching  would  greatly 
contribute to rebalancing the subject.
13   21 
Notes 
 
1 The ‘narrow’ economics profession may for practical purposes be regarded as 
being represented by academic economists working in universities and research 
institutions. 
2 See Smith 1998. Interestingly, as Smith notes, the textbook model referred to 
above  came  from  the  DAE  itself  during  Stone’s  period  as  Director.  It  is 
associated with the work of Durbin, Watson, Cochrane and Orcutt, all of whom 
worked at the Department under Stone. 
3 The following paragraphs in this section are based on an excellent collection 
of  memories  of  Brian  and  Barbara  Reddaway  by  their children,  friends  and 
associates from all over the world. These memories have been put together and 
edited  by  Lawrence  Reddaway  (2003).  The  quotations  all  come  from  this 
booklet.  
4 Other notable areas of his research, which will not be covered here, include 
labour  markets,  structural  change,  demography,  economic  growth  and 
contributions to economic history. See further Reddaway (1995) and Harcourt 
(2004). 
5 Today, it is not only the government and the CBI who are interested in such 
research,  but  even  more  so  the  workers  who  fear  job  losses  from  overseas 
investment by advanced country corporations (see further Singh, 2005). 
6 Professor John Toye has pointed out to me that Reddaway did not always 
maintain such high standards in his writings. In his 1939 book ‘Economics of a 
Declining Population’, he took at face value the Enid Charles projections of a 
fast  declining  UK  population.    Reddaway’s  response  to  this  lapse  was  that 
everybody  at  the  time  (Keynes,  Meade,  Joan  Robinson),  accepted  these 
demographic projections.  As Toye rightly notes, that this study does not fit in 
with the Reddaway  reputation  ‘for thinking things out from first principles and 
for seeking “to combine theory with realistic data”, which characterises most of 
his work.’ See also note 4 above.  
7  Reddaway  visited  the  Commission  in  1959-60  on  sabbatical  leave  from 
Cambridge. 
8 Reddaway made a similar point in his review of Keynes’s General Theory 
(Reddaway, 1936). He was critical of Keynes’s exposition with respect to the 
mutual  determination  of  savings,  investment,  income  and  rate  of  interest. 
Although  he  sympathized  with  Keynes’s  strictures  about  the  spurious  air  of 
precision introduced by too much mathematics, he nevertheless felt that it was 
difficult to express in words the solution to a system of simultaneous equations. 
A shorthand equation system would have been much more useful. 
9 I owe these points to Professor John Toye. 
10 See for example Whittington 2002. 
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11 McCloskey and Ziliak’s papers have recently been criticised by Hoover and 
Siegler(2005). Even if one were to accept Hoover and Siegler’s main point(and 
many will not) that significant tests have the merit of providing an assessment 
of the strength or weakness of the signal, nevertheless, McCloskey and Ziliak  
have  performed  a  signal  service  by    insisting  on  the  distinction  between 
economic and statistical significance in all  areas of applied econometrics.. 
12 I have abbreviated the question slightly. 
13 Brian Reddaway died in Cambridge after a short illness on 23 July 2002. 
After his retirement from the Chair of Political Economy at the University of 
Cambridge in 1980, he continued to be active as an economist and as economic 
adviser  to  many  developing  country  governments  and  gave  lectures  at  the 
Faculty  well  into  his  80s.  He  also  frequently visited  his  extended  family  in 
Australia,  the  USA  and  elsewhere  in  the  world  during  his  post-retirement 
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